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Water, Public Hygiene and Fire Control in Medieval 
Towns: Facing Collective Goods Problems while  
Ensuring the Quality of Life 
Ulf Christian Ewert ∗ 
Abstract: »Wasser, öffentliche Hygiene und Brandschutz: 
Zum Problem des Managements lebensstandardrelevanter 
Kollektivgüter in der mittelalterlichen Stadt«. Clean water, 
neat streets and fire prevention determined the quality of 
life also in medieval towns. While ensuring an environment 
worth living citizens were faced with collective goods prob-
lems. As a result of the environmentally harmful urban way 
of life common-pool resources like waters and streets were 
over-exploited, polluted and degraded. This urban tragedy 
of the commons was even more complicated, as public hy-
giene and fire prevention, both necessary to cope with pol-
lution and fire hazard, were public goods and their realisa-
tion caused a public goods dilemma. Due to coordination 
efforts – municipal administration, transfer of property 
rights, enhancement of voluntary cooperations and regula-
tions – common-pool resources like water and infrastructure 
could be provided, but municipal authorities barely suc-
ceeded in enforcing polluters to internalise the social costs 
of their behaviour and managing the supply of public pre-
ventive goods. Differently from the suggestion made in the 
concept of Environmental Kuznets Curve emergence of en-
vironmental externalities and treatment of communal risks 
were not only related to economic development, but also to 
population growth. 
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1. Introduction: water supply, public hygiene and fire 
prevention in medieval towns and their relevance to the 
quality of life 
The provision of citizens with clean water, streets and lanes that are kept neat 
and the protection of the community from fire hazard were vital components of 
the quality of life that could be enjoyed in medieval towns. Fresh water was of 
course used as drinking water, but was also needed for brewing and slaughter. 
It has been in particular a factor of production necessary to crafts such as the 
dyeing or the tannery and was exploited for grain-grinding by water milling 
(Guillerme 1988: 52). Enforcement and maintenance of public hygiene were of 
importance, because the spread of plague and other infectious diseases which 
put at risk the population as a whole was obviously promoted by the urban 
dwellers’ practice of using streets and waters for the disposal of excrements, 
animal carcasses and all other sorts of waste (Jankrift 2003: 151-166). Finally, 
as a fire presumably was the highest risk for the physical basis of urban settle-
ments, and damages due to town fires were extremely costly to repair, the 
omnipresent hazard coming from the use of open fire (Jankrift 2003: 86-89). 
had to be handled in order to guarantee urban dwellers a minimum quality of 
life at least. 
Why common waters in towns managed quite intensively were rather early 
in medieval history, but public hygiene and fire prevention even in the later 
Middle Ages were often not ensured sufficiently? How did communities cope 
with the polluting and endangering behaviour of inhabitants? Who was in 
charge of it, and what made people become aware of the communal risks they 
produced by a way of life that in every aspect was environmentally harmful? 
Discussing these questions, concepts dealing with economic characteristics of 
goods, with social dilemmata and environmental economics will be used. Yet, 
before stepping into analysis, two points have to be mentioned briefly, the 
historical development of urban communities during the Middle Ages and the 
role goods, in a wider theoretical meaning of the word, played for civic life. 
The high Middle Ages saw a resurgence of urban settlements all across 
Europe. It would probably be too much of a simplification of the quite hetere-
genous pattern of urbanisation to assume a uniform path of urban development. 
This notwithstanding some general statements nevertheless can be made. The 
revival of urban culture in Europe, after it had nearly ceased with the decline of 
the Roman empire in late antiquity, was promoted certainly by a sustained 
population growth that was due to an improvement in climate and an increase 
in agricultural productivity from the 11th century onward (Lopez 1998: 27-55). 
This economic upward shift allowed a quite small but nevertheless significant 
part of the population to be not obliged to spend their working efforts on the 
production of basic foodstuffs only. Instead these people could make their life 
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residing in towns and producing, refining and trading all sorts of commodities 
and services, because food-wise they could rely on the surplus of produce that 
was made by a still further growing rural population. Only in a smaller number 
of places the emerging urban settlements were built upon the remnants of an-
tiquity (Ennen 1987: 31-50; Guillerme 1988: 23-50). Many towns were newly 
founded ones, being under the rule of lay or clerical feudal lords who had 
granted economic privileges and a municipal law to the urban settlers  
(Ennen 1987: 118 f.). Subsequently thousands of towns arose and evolved all 
across Europe until the early 14th century. Having well started under the aus-
pices of feudal authorities, urban communities soon became, as a result of the 
social dynamics unfolding with their economic success, economically, politi-
cally and socially an alternative model to feudalism. In contrast to the hierar-
chical structure of the rural society the basic idea of urban culture was that of a 
political equality of the community members. Urban communities then at-
tempted both to liberate themselves from their feudal lords and to put down 
their political rights in written constitutions.1 Although a complete liberation 
from feudal rule rarely could be achieved – lay and clerical feudal lords com-
monly stayed in a de jure position of ownership for quite a long time – feudal 
authorities nonetheless had to accept that towns and cities had become rather 
independent political actors, at least with regard to issues of communal organi-
sation. 
The present approach is motivated by a goods paradox existing for medieval 
urban communities. Whereas economic rise of towns during the high Middle 
Ages and citizens’ accumulation of individual wealth were clearly based on 
handling private goods, civic life in contrast was shaped by different collective 
goods, these either being common-pool resources such as waters and streets or 
public goods like public hygiene and fire prevention. Forming communities per 
se meant for every member to enter into collaboration with others concerning 
the various aspects of daily life. As many resources and services could be used 
collectively, urban communities were confronted with a multiple collective 
goods dilemma and needed a management scheme to handle this problem. The 
goods paradox is obvious insofar as the literature on medieval urbanisation 
mainly focussed on the private economic goods aspect, namely production and 
trade, and its collective organisation in guilds. Even in studies on water supply 
the presence of collective goods and the difficulties arising from it are ac-
knowledged, but are not sufficiently treated as what they are – a fundamental 
problem of organisation (e.g. Guillerme 1988; Squatriti (ed.) 2000; Leguay 
2002). Surely, medieval towns often did not possess the kind of sophisticated 
technologies that had been in use in antiquity, regarding water supply for in-
stance. Yet, it seems as if towns with their representative comportement put the 
                                                             
1 The earliest of these attempts can be grasped in the Northern Italian cities during the 11th 
and 12th centuries, but the same kind of movement was under way in other European re-
gions in 13th and early 14th centuries. (Ennen 1987: 137-144). 
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emphasis more on the economic strength they had gained and the impressive 
results of municipal efforts, namely majestic city walls, high cathedrals and 
representative town halls  (Boockmann 1994: 35; Grewe 2000: 131) – all these 
items representing the abstract public good of urban freedom –, rather than 
taking care of communal services such as water supply, waste disposal or the 
maintenance of public hygiene. 
Water management (Guillerme 1988; Benoit/Wabont 1991; Grewe 1991; 
Squatriti (ed.) 2000; Leguay 2002), pollution and hygiene (Kühnel 1984; 
Dirlmeier 1986; Boockmann 1994; Leguay 1999; Schubert 2002; Jankrift 
2003) in medieval towns are not new subjects to the literature, indeed. These 
issues were described in detail for a variety of cities in medieval Europe. The 
new aspect added herein to the current knowledge about this topic is the analy-
sis of the communal risk management problem within an economic framework, 
an approach explicitly based on the rational-choice paradigm, and for this par-
ticular issue cannot be found in the literature so far. The approach is related to 
studies of Volckart (2004) and Lehmann (2004), who used rational-choice and 
economic concepts for their research into collective action in medieval village 
communities and into the rent seeking of the social élites in medieval and early 
modern Nuremberg, respectively. The aim here is to draw some general con-
clusions from medieval urban history regarding the communal risks being 
relevant to the quality of life, rather than describing a historical case in detail. 
Three points shall thereby be made: The fundamental problems arising in the 
provision of inhabitants with quality-of-life-ensuring collective goods is de-
scribed in section 2. A typology of solutions found to this problem is given in 
section 3. Changes over time in dealing with communal risks and public pre-
ventive goods will be discussed in section 4 with respect to population growth 
and economic development. 
2. The problem: negative externalities and collective 
goods dilemmata 
2.1 Negative externalities as a result of the urban way of life 
In many respects the way of life practised in medieval towns was environmen-
tally extremely harmful. First of all, the various crafts were characterised by 
countless water and also air polluting activities through which chemicals and 
organic materials were put into brooks, rivers and common waters, or stench 
was produced like in the case of the tanneries, abatoirs or breweries. A second 
major problem for the environment in towns concerned all kinds of waste. 
Spent water from households, kitchen slops and excrements were commonly 
deposited directly in the streets (Guillerme 1988: 116). Although for instance 
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in Northwestern German towns market places already had been paved, in 15th 
century the pavement was covered with a thick layer of organic waste (Schu-
bert 2002: 106, on Hannover; Jankrift 2003: 152, on Soest). The amount of 
excrements was increased due to the practice of keeping animals in the back-
yards of houses, but also in the streets (Delort 1989; Boockmann 1994: 84; 
Jankrift 2003: 161-166). Because cemeteries were located inside towns, water 
table and wells were constantly contaminated (Guillerme 1988: 116; Jankrift 
2003: 174-177). A third problem arose from the widespread use of open fire in 
the houses which was needed in production processes and of course for cook-
ing and heating (Jankrift 2003: 86-89). 
The environmental effects of this practice obviously reduced the quality of 
life. These effects also were in a sense communal risks, because by endanger-
ing either public hygiene or the physical integrity of houses, pollution and fire 
hazard put at risk the existence of the whole community. A town fire destroy-
ing many homes or the spread of diseases, fostered by contaminated water and 
filthy streets, were severe challenges to civic life. Using an economic term, 
these environmental impacts or communal risks were negative externalities. 
Externalities in general are those effects of human behaviour, which come as a 
rather unintentional side effect of it and thus are not relevant to the actor’s 
utility calculation, but nonetheless affect other actors by either providing them 
with benefits or causing costs to them (Gravelle/Rees 2004: 319 f.). Communal 
hazards in medieval towns were negative external effects of the urban dwellers’ 
daily life activities, because putting people at risk with pollution or fire cer-
tainly was neither the clear aim nor an intended consequence of these activities, 
it simply was a costly byproduct. 
2.2 Collective goods within the medieval town 
In a very general meaning of the word, collective goods are defined as being 
non-private and allowing a collective use. Economic characteristics of goods 
can be distinguished using the cross-classification of a good’s excludability 
versus its substractability (Dionisio/Gordo 2006: 323). Private goods are both 
substractable and excludable. In contrast, pure public goods (Olson 1965; Bu-
chanan 1999) are neither substractable nor excludable. Once a pure public good 
is produced, the good itself is not depletable and the marginal benefit consum-
ers derive from it is constant for anybody. Thus, there is no rivalry between the 
consumers of a pure public good. Also, no potential consumer can be excluded 
from consumption, either because it is impossible or is too costly to get ac-
cepted. Besides the conventional private good and the pure public good two 
other ideal types of goods do exist, which both can be used collectively. If a 
good for instance is excludable but not substractable, one speaks of a club 
good. Like a pure public good it is not depletable, but consumption can be 
restricted to the members of a »club«, who pay a fee in return for their privilege 
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of consuming the good. Vice versa, if a good is substractable but not exclud-
able, it is a common-pool resource, meaning that it is open to everybody but 
itself is depletable. 
Inhabitants of medieval towns dealed with various types of private goods 
indeed. These were the foodstuffs, commodities and services that either were 
consumed or produced, refined and traded by them. Wealth in towns thus was 
based mainly on the exchange of private economic goods, but daily life was 
shaped by a variety of collective goods, not necessarily always being physical 
objects, anyway. Some of these collective goods such as the streets or common 
waters were of material nature. Some others like civil rights, jurisdiction, price 
stability (Persson 1999: 72) or even the notice of time on public clocks (Dohrn-
van Rossum 1992) were intangible because of their immaterial character. A 
town’s defense is an illustrative example of a non-material collective good – 
defending the community’s integrity – to be materialised in a physical collec-
tive good – the massive town walls, probably the best-known symbol of the 
medieval European town, that in many places were constructed in 12th to 14th 
centuries to protect everyone living inside these walls. 
In using the typology described above different kinds of medieval urban col-
lective goods can be distinguished. Water and streets were typical common-
pool resources, and they were subject to pollution, which of course is one as-
pect of depletion. Political participation rights or even economic privileges in 
turn were club goods, because only those urban dwellers who had the formal 
status of being a citizen could benefit from these goods.2 Inhabitants without 
such a qualification, and there were many of them, had no access to these 
goods. In contrast, public hygiene, protection against fire hazard or price stabil-
ity on the local grain market were public goods. Everybody living in the com-
munity, no matter whether he was a formal citizen or not, was to benefit from 
this, without reducing the marginal utility of other inhabitants. Nobody could 
be excluded from consumption, and for public hygiene or fire control this was 
not wanted either, since these public preventive goods were vital elements in 
the protection of civil life. They were needed to cope with the negative exter-
nalities produced by urban dwellers, these effects being public goods as well. 
At first glance, the term »good« seems to be a misnomer with regard to pollu-
tion and fire hazard, because nobody really wanted to consume this kind of 
good. Being a subject to such risks, everybody nonetheless had to. 
Dilemmata with respect to the supply and the management of goods will 
arise if goods are non-excludable. Yet, the quality of life in medieval towns 
was based to a large extent on the management of collective goods. While 
using or misusing common-pool resources such as waters and streets, inhabi-
tants directly influenced the environmental component of their quality of life. 
Hence, the management of quality-of-life-securing collective goods was about 
                                                             
2 Privileges and services merchant and craft guilds provided for their members also were club 
goods inasmuch as the benefit of these goods was limited to members. 
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dealing with common-pool resources, communal risks and preventive means. 
Ensuring an environment worth living meant to tackle a twofold collective 
goods dilemma that was related to the supply and exploitation of common-pool 
resources and the provision of public preventive goods. 
2.3 The urban tragedy of the commons 
Pollution and depletion of the town’s common-pool resources were visible 
results of the environmentally harmful production methods and the inhabitants’ 
way of life. These negative externalities point to a more general pattern of a 
degrading treatment of the environment which aptly could be labelled the me-
dieval urban tragedy of the commons. The term tragedy of the commons was 
first formulated by Hardin in 1968.3 Following this theorem, without a proper 
management and the formulation of generally binding rules, common-pool 
resources will be over-exploited. Moreover, if devices are necessary to make a 
common-pool resource available to a larger number of users, like in the case of 
water in medieval towns, nobody would deliberately provide such devices due 
to strong incentives to free-ride on others’ investments (Volckart 2004: 28). As 
it is a non-exclusive but depletable and scarce good, the natural environment is 
the classic example of a common-pool resource being prone to over-
exploitation. More generally, risk-free surroundings were a common-pool 
resource in medieval towns that by producing hygienic risks and fire hazard 
were constantly degraded. The reason for the users’ degrading behaviour in 
such a situation is a mis-specification of the incentive structure they face. All of 
them directly receive utility from using the resource, in medieval towns for 
instance by draining off their sewage into common waters or depositing their 
waste in the streets, but as those refraining from doing so are not rewarded, 
there is no incentive for anybody to change behaviour such that it would do less 
harm to the environment. 
The concept was criticised for ignoring two points: it has been argued, that 
in contrast to the initially made assumption of being a non-exclusive good, 
historically for most common-pool resources its use in fact was limited to a 
small group of individuals, and that rules for the use were applied, minimising 
the problem of a potential over-exploitation (Ostrom 1994; Ostrom et al. 1994). 
It cannot be denied, that these objections are correct, and Hardin (1994) himself 
later on coined the probably more precise term of the unmanaged tragedy of 
the commons. For its present application to water supply, pollution and other 
communal risks in medieval towns, the theorem is nonetheless of instructive 
value, because it stresses the necessity of management routines for the town’s 
infrastructure. Although in the medieval case these resources were used by a 
                                                             
3 In fact, the understanding of common property being prone to neglect and misuse dates 
back to the ancient greek writers Thucydides and Aristotle. 
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well-defined group of individuals – the town’s inhabitants –, group size could 
very well grow to a number such that negative environmental externalities were 
intensified and subsequently common-pool resources could easily be damaged 
or depleted. 
As the medieval urban tragedy of the commons was related to pollution and 
other communal risks, concepts recommended to minimise negative external-
ities are of interest. Typical solutions discussed in environmental economics 
are governmental regulations proscribing polluting activities, tradeable emis-
sions permits, tariffs on pollution or the entering into contracts (Hodge 1995; 
Hanley et al. 2001). These means help to convert the social costs of a negative 
externality into individual costs to be payed by the perpetrator of this effect. 
This is called internalisation of costs (Gravelle/Rees 2004: 319-323). In the 
example of pollution in medieval towns this would mean that instead of depos-
iting waste directly in the streets and leaving fellow citizens with the disgusting 
stench and the hygienic hazards coming from it, everybody would have faced 
an incentive to refrain from such an activity, if one has had to pay for it. All 
means proposed do have two prerequisites in common: the existence of an 
authority capable of monitoring environmental effects, defining rules, taxing 
pollution and enforcing contracts, and the assignment of well-defined property 
rights over the common-pool resource. This especially becomes clear in the 
Coase theorem (Coase 1960). In principle the polluter and the person con-
cerned by pollution should always be able to sign a contract by which the inter-
nalisation of social costs is guaranteed, as long as property rights are defined, 
the full extent of negative externalities is known and negotiation costs are ir-
relevant (Gravelle/Rees 2004: 320 f.; Volckart 2004: 25). Since in medieval 
towns the perpetrators of risks and those concerned were not only numerous, 
but often also identical persons, a bilateral contractual solution seems quite 
unrealistic. Nevertheless, this result helps understanding medieval cases insofar 
as it points to the importance of a property rights definition, of knowledge 
about the environmental impacts of human behaviour and of potential barriers 
to the balance of conflicting interests. 
2.4 The public goods dilemma with respect to public hygiene and 
fire control 
In principle, negative externalities such as pollution or fire hazard leading to an 
urban tragedy of the commons could have been faced by maintaining public 
hygiene and organising a preventive fire protection. In both cases voluntary 
cooperation of urban dwellers was needed. Communal risks could have been 
reduced by changing behaviour to a more careful treatment of the environment, 
and by investing in preventive means. Prevention could have been ensured by 
cleaning streets, paving them, so that they can easier be kept neat, or in the case 
of fire hazard, by handling fire with care, building stone houses instead of 
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wooden ones and having devices at hand which facilitate fighting a fire, such as 
buckets, ladders or fire crooks (Jankrift 2003: 91). Since prevention was a 
public good, its supply could have been complicated due to a public goods 
dilemma arising. The incentive structure urban dwellers faced, making them 
unwilling to contribute voluntarily to a reduction or even avoidance of commu-
nal risks, is analysed using the game theoretical model known as prisoners’ 
dilemma (Kreps 1990: 28-29, 37-39). Following assumptions are made in this 
game: players (urban dwellers) receive utility if public hygiene or fire protec-
tion are guaranteed. They can simultaneously choose either to contribute to 
public hygiene – by avoiding hazardous waste deposit, cleaning or paving 
streets, for instance – or fire protection – by using fire with care, buying fire 
fighting tools or making houses fire-proof, for example – or not to make such 
investments. Players seek to maximise their individual utility level and are 
eager to avoid risks. By taking into consideration possible actions of other 
players they also act strategically. Entering into contracts is impossible, and 
also institutions do not exist by which conflicting interests could be coordi-
nated or mutual agreements would be enforced. 
A simple game for players A and B is defined as follows: Costs CA and CB 
are the players’ individual contribution to the maintenance of a certain level of 
public hygiene, for instance.4 In a cooperative solution both players accept to 
bear an equal share TC/2 of total maintenance costs TC = CA + CB, but each of 
them is willing to pay the amount of WPi ≥ TC/2, if that level of public hygiene 
could be realised. There are two differences to the classic public goods prob-
lem5: differently to the production of knowledge for instance, here the public 
good (hygiene) cannot be generated by the efforts of one player only, simply 
because this would be too costly. Thus, both WPA and WPB are definitely below 
TC. Moreover, public hygiene can only be realised if all players are contribut-
ing to its maintenance. In addition, a failure in maintaining a certain level of 
public hygiene would cause health risks. As a consequence, the absence of the 
public good is felt by the players as a disutility –Ui, and in fact they are at risk 
if public hygiene cannot be guaranteed. The amount of disutility cannot be 
clearly specified, but assuming risk aversion it certainly is below 0, and even if 
players are not aware of the hygienic risks coming from contaminated water 
and filthy streets, this value would equal 0 at best. Naturally, the rather abstract 
willingness to pay can only be converted into utility if the public good con-
cerned is actually generated. In the cooperative solution utility is calculated by 
subtracting individual costs from the willingness to pay (WPi – Ci). For the 
remaining potential outcomes where public hygiene will not be generated, 
because at least one player is not contributing, players would face a disutility  
–Ui, and in case they would decide to contribute while the other would not, also 
                                                             
4 Exactly the same setting applies to the organisation of fire prevention and fire protection. 
5 This problem is described in terms of the prisoners’ dilemma in Holler/ Illing 1996: 8 f. 
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had to write off their own share of costs. Utility levels are displayed in the pay-
off matrix of Table 1. 
Table 1: Pay-off matrix of a two-player public preventive goods realisation 
game 
Player B
Player A contributing not contributing Min. (A)
contributing A: WPA – TC/2
B: WPB – TC/2
A: –UA – TC/2
B: –UB
–UA – TC/2
not
contributing
A: –UA
B: –UB – TC/2
A: –UA
B: –UB
–UA
Min. (B) –UB – TC/2 –UB
 
 
For the two-player game, the result can easily be derived from the behav-
ioural assumptions that are made. For the purpose of maximising own utility 
but minimising risk both players will play a min-max-strategy, that is, they will 
opt for the best result of their personal worst cases, which is not to contribute.6 
Players’ acknowledgement of the positive value public hygiene has and also a 
strong disutility due to lacking public hygiene are insufficient conditions to 
finally attain neat streets and surroundings free of risks. The problem is not 
caused by free-riding as in the case of the classic public goods dilemma. Since 
by definition public hygiene cannot be ensured without all players contributing, 
free-riding is impossible here. Players will not contribute, because they fear 
that their personal investment would be useless. Keeping the street in front of 
the own house clean by no means will reduce the hygienic risk if the other is 
not doing the same. As the public preventive good »public hygiene« will not be 
realised, this outcome, called the Nash-equilibrium  (Kreps 1990: 28-36), is not 
an optimum result of course, neither with respect to individual nor to overall 
utility. If both players decided to contribute, they would be better off individu-
ally as well as community-wise. This notwithstanding, refraining from contri-
bution is nonetheless a rational decision given the behavioural assumptions of 
the game.7 The much better result of both parties contributing8 can only be 
attained by third-party-enforcement or mutual trust, elements missing in this 
particular setting. 
                                                             
6 Not to contribute gives the maximum of the minima, which is –Ui, respectively, players A 
and B would have to face with regard to the other players possible decision. 
7 Even if players do not acknowledge the benefits from public hygiene (WPi = 0) and do not 
perceive hygienic risks as such (–Ui = 0), the outcome will be the same. 
8 With WPi ≥ TC/2 and –Ui the cooperative solution of the game is Pareto-efficient insofar as 
neither of the players can improve the own utility level, and therefore also cannot be better 
off without decreasing the other’s utility level (Gravelle/Rees 2004: 283 f.). 
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The game can be easily extended to the more realistic case of n players. For 
each player the willingness to pay for the maintenance of public hygiene re-
mains below total cost (WPi < TC), but again is greater or equal the individual 
costs of contribution (TC/n). Differently from the two-player-game, now for 
generating the public good not all players involved necessarily have to decide 
to cooperate. Public hygiene nonetheless can only be realised if a considerable 
number of players contribute. Public hygiene is not guaranteed if only a few 
urban dwellers would refrain from depositing their waste in the streets.9 Utility 
levels for each player i are calculated in exactly the same way as in the two-
player game (see Table 2 for pay-offs). 
Table 2: Pay-offs for player i in a n-player public preventive goods realisation 
game 
Number j of other players contributing
Player i n – 1 n – 2 … n – … … 0 Min. (i)
contributing WPi – TC/n WPi – TC/(n–1) … Ui – TC/n … Ui – TC/n –Ui – TC/n
not
contributing WPi WPi … –Ui … –Ui –Ui
public good is realised ⇐ public good is not realised ⇐
 
To a certain degree, returns now depend upon the number j of players other 
than i contributing, because if enough players decided to contribute and public 
hygiene could be guaranteed, these players would have to pay the maintenance 
costs.10 For a particular player i the worst case scenario still is the one where he 
would pay for the maintenance, but many other players would not, so that 
public hygiene cannot be guaranteed in the end. Thus, the equilibrium reached 
will be exactly the same as in the simpler two-player case. Free-riding now is 
possible, and this can enhance peoples’ unwillingness to contribute to public 
hygiene even furthermore, because the own contribution not only is perceived 
as being useless, there is also an opportunity to get rid of the unpleasant hygi-
enic risks without paying for it.11 
                                                             
9 This assumption is certainly too weak in the case of fire hazard. In fact, a single household 
not taking care while handling fire was sufficient to cause a devastating town fire (Jankrift 
2003: 87). 
10 If not enough players contribute to finally realise the public preventive good, each player 
will have to write off the equal-share-contribution (TC/n) only. 
11 The result does not change if the game is played in a sequential mode and players no longer 
have to decide simultaneously. For that reason the outcome can be called a missing-hero-
dilemma (Diekmann 1992), because on rational grounds no player would decide to contrib-
ute, being one of the »heros« who pays for the maintenance of public hygiene. And even if, 
for whatever reason, enough players had decided to contribute, incentives for the remaining 
players would not be altered in a way that contribution is encouraged. Quite the reverse, 
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Describing the situation in medieval towns an open ended repeated game is 
an even more appropriate model. In general, trust between players can be built 
up if a game is played repeatedly. A setting with infinite repetitions then can 
make players opting for cooperation, accepting temporary losses of utility in 
one round, because with trust the likelihood of being compensated in subse-
quent rounds is quite high.12 As long as not all players’ contributions are 
needed to finally realise the public good, there still exist incentives to free-ride, 
and each free-rider can assume that his own decision will not prevent the pro-
duction of the public good (Volckart 2004: 28). Mutual trust cannot be effec-
tive for another reason here: trust is a powerful tool for the coordination of 
private interests in small groups (Diekmann 1992), but towns had too many 
inhabitants for cooperations to be based on trusted relationships only and for 
effectively preventing free-riding. Hence, as with players assumed to behave 
rationally a voluntary care for risk avoidance and the provision of public pre-
ventive goods such as public hygiene or fire prevention was barely possible, in 
medieval towns other solutions had to be found to overcome this public goods 
dilemma. 
3. Solutions to the problem: institutions to manage  
collective goods 
3.1 The necessity of managing collective goods and the  
importance of municipalities 
Tragedy of the commons and public goods dilemmata both demonstrate that 
property rights and enforcement are of importance when dealing with collective 
goods. Water supply and the problem of pollution and other communal risks 
had to be somehow organised to overcome the lack of voluntary contributions 
to the maintenance of common-pool resources and to risk prevention. For man-
agement institutions were needed. Following North’s definition (1990: 3) »in-
stitutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the hu-
manly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or eco-
nomic.« Medieval communities developed various institutional arrangements 
by which collective goods dilemmata could be mitigated. These institutions 
                                                                                                                                
while free-riding on the others’ investments the last players to decide could benefit from 
public hygiene already ensured. 
12 In contrast, given a finite number of repetitions and players knowing when the last will be 
played, cooperation cannot be reached. Players will decide not to contribute in the last 
round, because no more rounds to be compensated for losses are left. This last-round ra-
tionale can be transferred backward to earlier rounds, yielding always the same result (Ax-
elrod 1990: 10; Volckart 2004: 28). 
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allowed to manage water supply, public hygiene or fire control. A careful ex-
ploitation of common-pool resources and the provision of public goods both 
can be secured by an authority capable of enforcing a cooperation of individu-
als that is beneficial for the community as a whole. A third party or a collective 
actor would be such an authority (Greif 2000: 256 f.). In medieval towns coop-
eration could be enforced by the feudal lord, being at least formally the owner 
of the town, and by municipal councils which acted on behalf of feudal lords 
or, in cases where towns had gained a certain degree of political autonomy, on 
behalf of the community itself. To provide collective goods and prevent misuse 
of these resources, municipal authorities took care of the management of col-
lective goods themselves, they defined property rights and assigned them to 
private persons, enhanced voluntary cooperations of inhabitants and tried to 
regulate environmental behaviour. 
3.2. Municipal care of collective goods 
As it was needed for commercial activities as well as for personal use and for 
cleansing, water was the classic common-pool resource in medieval towns. 
Municipal care mainly targeted the water infrastructure. Canals, aqueducts, 
cisterns, ditches, gutters and sewers were built to enable energy production by 
water mills, to provide the water using crafts and allow sewages to be drained 
off (Guillerme 1988: 51-77, Benoit/Rouillard 2000: 191 f. on France; Magnus-
son/Squatriti 2000: 227-231, 243-251, on Italy). Sewers were maintained by 
the community and had to be cleaned on a regular basis, as can be seen from 
municipal accounts for Paris (Benoit/Rouillard 2000: 203). Another field of 
municipal investment was the construction of household water supply systems, 
which had already started in the high Middle Ages. The infrastructure neces-
sary for water supply, a network of pipes, was maintained by the community.13 
These systems were substitutes for the older practice of the inhabitants’ provi-
sion with water taken from privately owned wells. Paving streets and market 
places, which helped in keeping the public space tidy, and in German towns for 
instance became a standard since the late 13th century (Jankrift 2003: 153), was 
also a subject of municipalisation. 
Construction and maintenance of hydrography and the care of other infra-
structure devices was an expensive endeavour of course and thus could usually 
not be made available to the urban population by private initiatives only. If 
high investments are necessary to produce or maintain collective goods, as a 
rule of thumb this naturally becomes a public business. Municipalities took 
over in order to provide these goods and services, a strategy by which the typi-
cal public goods problem of non-participation could be solved, in part at least. 
                                                             
13 See on the distribution of water within town in general Leguay 2002: 173-217; cf. Magnus-
son/Squatriti 2000: 251, for Orvieto, and Grewe 2000: 145-151, for several German towns 
(Brunswick, Goslar, Stralsund, Königsberg, Danzig, Freiburg, Nuremberg,Würzburg). 
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However, financial resources were limited, and with princes in the late Middle 
Ages often using their towns as financial backers and asking them to reinforce 
the town’s defense system or to build town residences14, an additional external 
limit to the budget existed. Especially the maintenance of city walls was quite 
expensive, and in 14th and 15th centuries these investments which had to be 
payed by the inhabitants usually were the biggest share of towns’ total ex-
penses (Boockmann 1994: 34; Guillerme 1988: 119 f.). As a consequence, 
finances often allowed to invest either in prestigious and representative projects 
or in the improvement of public hygiene and the reduction of communal risks. 
3.3 Definition and transfer of property rights 
Whenever municipalisation was too costly, the supply of collective goods had 
to be secured in other ways. Such an alternative to a full-range municipal care 
was defining property rights over common-pool resources and granting rights 
to use these resources. Numerous examples show that medieval municipalities 
pursued this strategy quite often. Common-pool resources came under the rule 
of municipal authorities, and as a result by this claim of property the use of 
these resources had to be authorised by the municipality and could then be 
organised under the community’s supervision. In Orvieto for instance, the city 
has granted around 1300 concessions for private pipes which extended the 
community-maintained water supply system (Magnusson/Squatriti 2000: 251). 
In 15th century Nuremberg public access to wells was guaranteed whenever 
they were located on public land, no matter who had financed the construction 
of the well (Grewe 2000: 148). In Minden and Cologne waste disposal on cer-
tain areas and the construction of private sewers had to be authorised by the 
town council (Jankrift 2003: 179 f.). If a street was too filthy, it was sometimes 
even closed by municipal order and thus taken away from public use (Jankrift 
2003: 160, on 15th century examples from Paderborn and Cologne). 
Transferring the rights to use to private persons would be especially useful if 
investments were too costly for the community or if profits could be made out 
of the use of a common-pool resource. Examples of a sophisticated high-cost 
technology are the water supply systems that relied on artificial pumps. Such 
systems were implemented in several German towns in the late Middle Ages, 
financed by private consortia. Construction was signed in a contract between 
investors and towns, and commonly the control over the system was assigned 
to the main user of the device. In Lübeck this were the brewers, for instance. In 
Bremen the Wasserradgesellschaft that was founded in 1394 of a group of 
citizens including all town councillors was permitted to build a water wheel at 
a particular location on the banks of the river Weser (Grewe 2000: 151-153). In 
                                                             
14 See Ewert 2006: 436-446, on a game theoretical approach to cooperation and conflict 
between princes and towns during the late Middle Ages. 
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these examples communities received powerful water supply systems in return 
for giving property rights away to private persons. 
Although property rights were transferred in these cases as well, the man-
agement of water mills and public baths was a little different. Medieval towns 
had quite a long experience regarding the municipal care of all matters related 
to the provision of inhabitants with grain. Grain storage in public granaries 
which was useful to smooth price volatility on grain markets, is an example of 
municipalisation (Ewert/Roehl/Uhrmacher 2007). Water mills were indispen-
sable for grain-grinding. Controlling mills therefore was important for securing 
the grain provision of the urban population.15 Medieval towns often owned 
water mills, but instead of operating the mills themselves, grain-grinding was 
licensed to a miller in return for a fee. Property rights over a common-pool 
resource, the mill, were transferred to a holder, which then could charge users 
of the services produced with this resource and take care about its conservation. 
The legal basis of running a public bath was quite similar. Since most of the 
houses did not possess sanitary facilities, public baths were a vital component 
in maintaining public health, enabling people to keep a certain level of personal 
hygiene. Visitors could be charged for taking a bath. Although medieval mu-
nicipalities also owned and operated baths, there were other forms of owner-
ship, for instance investors who had been granted the right to use common 
waters (Magnusson/Squatriti 2000: 253 f.; Leguay 2002: 236). The common-
pool resource »water« was transformed to a club good »bath house«, and pub-
lic health was converted into personal hygiene. In both cases – the lease of 
water mills and the authorisation of baths – collective goods could be supplied 
because property rights were transferred. The municipality was not necessarily 
operating these resources, but was needed for property rights assignment and 
for the enforcement of proper use. In addition, pricing was elementary to 
achieve this, turning collective goods into private ones. 
3.4 Enhancement of voluntary cooperation 
If the community itself was neither able nor willing to care for collective 
goods, this gap could also be closed by voluntary cooperations of people con-
cerned. Private initiatives could be fostered by compensating people for the 
investments they had made in producing a collective good. In Siena those citi-
zens willing to build cisterns and collective wells were offered a payment and 
free lime in return for their efforts (Magnusson/Squatriti 2000: 244). In Viterbo 
water was discharged to individual proprietors during exactly specified periods. 
In return, part time proprietors had to maintain the water supply system (Mag-
                                                             
15 Northern German late medieval towns often owned mills, whereas in the South private 
ownership was more prevalent (Göbel 1993: 41-48). See on milling in Northern France 
Guillerme 1988: 107-116, on Toulouse Benoit/Rouillard 2000: 192 f., and on Italy Magnus-
son/Squatriti 2000: 258-265. 
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nusson/Squatriti 2000: 236). A delegation of responsibility for the supply of a 
collective good to a group could also be enforced by assigning a formal status 
to this group. This pattern can be identified with the well collectives (Brun-
nengemeinschaften) that were founded in many German towns from the end of 
the 13th century onwards. These cooperations being regulated by written rules 
secured the public supply of water which had relied on private wells before 
(Grewe 2000: 145). Social networks and formal groups could also function as a 
non-municipal control to enforce the appropriate use of collective goods, as it 
was the case with the wool guild in Siena or the butchers’ guild in Viterbo 
which had in their formal statutes regulations concerning the correct use of 
fountains (Magnusson/Squatriti 2000: 258). 
Cooperative solutions that in part were also trust-based can be found in me-
dieval urban history as well. In principle, by reputation and trust people could 
be enhanced to contribute to the production and preservation of collective 
goods, but in large communities incentives to free-ride on others’ investments 
were simply too strong. In smaller groups and over time trust worked quite well 
as a mechanism of coordination, and it seems that by trustworthy relationships 
at least a basis for voluntary cooperation could be created. For the purpose of 
preventive fire protection such cooperations were founded. The fire guilds that 
existed in Northern German towns from the 15th century onwards are such 
examples. They served mainly as a kind of mutual insurance, compensating for 
damages and losses due to fire, but also were the basis for organising fire pro-
tection more systematically (Grewe 1991: 71). In all examples mentioned in 
this section a collective good was transformed into a club good, an efficient 
strategy to enhance voluntary contribution as well as preservation. 
3.5 Regulations and the demand for personal responsibility 
By municipalisation, transfer of property rights and enhancement of voluntary 
cooperations it was possible for medieval communities to mitigate the supply 
problem of a quality-of-life-related collective good such as water. Achieving 
preservation of this good and of other collectively used infrastructure was even 
harder. As the maintenance of the systems remained under the supervision of 
the community, they were often managed rather poorly due to budget restric-
tions and thus are typical examples of common-pool resources to be constantly 
degraded. In Italian towns taking water from civic water supply devices like 
wells and fountains was often free of charge (Magnusson/Squatriti 2000: 241). 
In connection with water supply typically free-riding evolved. French royal 
decrees of the 15th century recurrently mentioned private derivations of water 
from an aqueduct in Paris, namely by members of the high nobility (Be-
noit/Rouillard 2000: 200). Prohibitions of waste disposal in common waters are 
numerous, showing that pollution was a serious and quite notorious problem 
(Benoit/Rouillard 2000: 203; Leguay 2002: 120, 124; Magnusson/Squatriti 
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2000: 253, 256). In Northwestern German towns municipal responsibility of 
cleaning the pavement can be observed not until the late 15th century (Jankrift 
2003: 153 f.). A similar rule applies to fire prevention which was poorly organ-
ised even in the late Middle Ages. In the 15th century regulations concerning 
fire fighting can be found16, but in many German towns the municipal organisa-
tion of fire fighting was commonly confined to reimburse private persons for 
their efforts made while fighting a fire and to employ people who’s duty it was 
to warn of fire (Grewe 1991: 71, on Cologne and Lübeck; Jankrift 2003: 92-98, 
on Munich). 
Enforcement of people to refrain from deteriorating common-pool resources 
and to contribute to the prevention of risks can also be exercised by command 
or moral appeals. This becomes clear when looking upon the incentive struc-
ture of the public goods dilemma. To enhance contribution incentives have to 
be changed. A powerful collective actor can either order individuals to choose 
the contribution strategy or try to convince them doing so, hoping that people 
will feel responsible for the common property. With respect to public hygiene 
and fire prevention these instruments appeared quite frequently in medieval 
towns. First regulations concerning pollution and public hygiene were issued in 
Italian and French cities in the 13th century, mainly calling for cleanness and 
sanitation and aiming at regulating the disposal of organic waste materials into 
waters and streets (Balestracci 1998; Leguay 2002: 136 f., on Avignon; Mag-
nusson/Squatriti 2000: 253 f., 256 f., on Milano, Ferrara and Verona). This 
kind of strategy to improve sanitation and risk awareness was imitated by mu-
nicipalities elsewhere in Europe during the late Middle Ages. Already the 
Sachsenspiegel, the earliest and by far most influential German law book that 
dates back to the first half of the 13th century and of which regulations were 
copied into many German municipal laws, contained rules concerning public 
hygiene and fire prevention. Toilets had to be put into a shelter of bricks that 
was extended to the ground to protect neighbouring areas from excrements and 
stench. Ovens had to be covered such that sparks could not cause a fire hazard 
for the house itself as well as for other houses (Oldenburger Sachsenspiegel 
2006: fol. 56v-57r). In Northwestern German towns disposal of waste and 
sewage had to be carried out by the households themselves. Usually, the towns’ 
municipal councils would intervene only if public interest was severely endan-
gered. Thus, draining off sewage often caused disputes between inhabitants, 
and the town council then was needed as a referee to settle such conflicts (Jank-
rift 2003: 177-180). Other regulations can be found regarding fire control. In 
Cologne and Munich for instance, in 14th and 15th centuries people were re-
quested to have fire fighting devices like ladders, buckets or crooks at hand. 
Furthermore, to minimise the risk of a fire to spread, the houses’ roofs had to 
be tiled with tiles instead of thatches or wooden materials. 
                                                             
16 Such regulations were issued in many important Europaen cities, for instance London in 
late 12th century, Bruges in 1232 or Lübeck in 1276 (Jankrift 2003: 91). 
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Appeals did not succeed as the situation of public hygiene did not improve 
significantly, and fire prevention was not sufficiently well organised either. 
This was because of two reasons: firstly, enforcement was inadequate. Coming 
back to the public goods realisation game, a fine equal or greater than the share 
of contribution TC/n to the provision of a public preventive good would have 
been enough to change the incentive structure such that contributing would 
have become a utility maximising choice. Although in principle violating regu-
lations was punished17, due to lacking monitoring opportunities municipal 
authorities seemingly were not capable of rigorously enforcing these regula-
tions. A key element for this kind of enforcement to succeed is that individuals 
face a high likelihood of being detected in case of offending against rules (Vol-
ckart 2004: 28). This was usually not the case with waste disposal in medieval 
towns, and interestingly enough, town officials in Wesel tried to improve the 
hygienic moral of inhabitants at the end of the 14th century by letting control-
lers watch over the cleanness of streets and granting them the right to take half 
of the fines imposed on polluters (Jankrift 2003: 159). Secondly, as has been 
shown in environmental sociology, people are willing to contribute to the pres-
ervation of the environment as long as the requested activities are cheap for 
them.18 In the medieval urban case the usual demands for personal responsibil-
ity to reduce and prevent communal risks were not of a low-cost character for 
inhabitants at all. As buying fire fighting devices or making roofs fire-proof 
was costly, and as also the disposal of waste would have been expensive, if it 
was not done by burying the waste in the backyard of houses or throwing it 
directly onto the street, people instead faced a high-cost situation, which made 
voluntary contribution to a cleaner environment rather unlikely. 
                                                             
17 Fines were a common practice, for instance if, as it was the case in Lübeck, fire ordinances 
were offended against (Grewe 1991: 71). In the example of the water supply system in 
Bremen customers who had manipulated the pipe and had attempted to take more water 
than allowed to were punished by demolition of their water tank (Grewe 2000: 157). In Ital-
ian cities a punishment for the misuse of fountains was sometimes also the banishment from 
town (Magnusson/Squatriti 2000: 257). 
18 Low-cost and high-cost situations for decision are distinguished with respect to the costs 
individuals would have to contribute to the preservation of the environment (Diek-
mann/Preisendörfer 1998: 240 f.). 
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4. Development over time: too poor to be risk aware? 
4.1 I-PAT-identity and Environmental Kuznets Curve:  
accounting for the impact of population and wealth on the  
emergence of negative externalities 
In medieval towns degradation of common-pool resources was confronted with 
regulations. Are changes over time observed both in the emergence of negative 
externalities and in peoples’ attitudes towards pollution and the treatment of 
other risks? The classic view of the medieval city as having been a crowded, 
polluted and unhealthy place is somewhat inaccurate, because this image seem-
ingly catches the environmental and hygienic situation of the later Middle Ages 
only (Guillerme 1988: 116). Assuming a fundamental change in the living 
conditions of urban dwellers means to look upon potential factors driving this 
change, namely population growth, population density and an increasing 
wealth in towns. 
Demography and environmental economics have developed tools to study 
the correlation of population, income and environmental effects (Crop-
per/Griffiths 1994). A quite popular concept to assess the population impact on 
the environment is the I-PAT-approach (Ehrlich/Holdren 1971). An environ-
mental impact I, which is the degree of pollution, is related to population size 
P, the level of affluence A and the environmental features of the production 
technology T that is in use. Affluence is given as per capita income and tech-
nology is measured in terms of pollution per unit income. Applying the 
mathematical identity displayed below, the total amount of pollution can be 
decomposed into factors, allowing to distinguish population, income and tech-
nology effects.19 
 
Affluence Technology
Income
Pollution
Population
IncomePopulationI ××=
 
 
As can be seen from the I-PAT-identity, negative environmental external-
ities will increase in intensity as the population is growing and becoming 
richer. More people will ceteris paribus increase the total amount of pollution. 
                                                             
19 Using growth rates instead of levels and taking logarithms, an increase in pollution can be 
written as a linear function of population growth, per capita income growth and improve-
ments in technology: ln(I t / I0) = ln(Pt /P0) + ln(At/A0) + ln(Tt /T0). 
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Technology is a scaling factor by which the degree of pollution can either be 
dipped or lifted, and a higher level of income is assumed to induce technologi-
cal progress which then helps to relax the strain that is put on the environment 
by a growing population. In the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) the po-
tential relationship between environmental degradation and wealth is specified 
more precisely. This concept is based upon the empirical regularity of an in-
verted U-shaped function displaying the correlation between these variables. In 
many studies on pollution this type of functional relation was found (An-
dreoni/Levinson 2001; Hill/Magnani 2002; Levinson 2002; Yandle et al. 2004; 
Deacon/Norman 2006). Quite similar to the I-PAT-identity the impact of hu-
man activity on the physical environment at first becomes more detrimental 
with the income rising, but after the threshold of a certain level of affluence is 
passed, pollution will be reduced and environmental degradation begins to 
cease although income increases furthermore. The term EKC was coined with 
reminiscence to the Kuznets curve  (Selden/Song 1994), proposed by Kuznets 
and saying that throughout economic development per capita income and in-
come inequality are related to each other with an inverted U-shaped function 
(Kuznets 1955; van Zanden 1995). 
Figure 1: A schematic sketch of an Environmental Kuznets Curve 
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Although suffering from theoretical and empirical problems, this concept is 
intuitively appealing.20 From a theoretical point of view it is somewhat impre-
cise, because distinct explanations are given for the relationship of affluence 
                                                             
20 An empirical problem arises if several cases (towns, regions or states) are studied in a 
cross-section. The U-shaped sketch then is found mainly because cases are in different 
stages of economic development, and not because environmental degradation for a particu-
lar case necessarily changes over time with the population’s per capita income rising (Dea-
con/Norman 2006). 
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and pollution to be inverted U-shaped. A possible reason for the upper tail to 
decrease is that environmental quality can be seen as a component of the qual-
ity of life which is appreciated only after a certain level of affluence has been 
attained and basic needs are satisfied (psychological explanation). The decrease 
alternatively is interpreted as the effect of pricing environmental hazards that 
had not been priced before (micro-economics explanation, Yandle et al. 2004: 
6), as a result of economies of scale that evolve in controlling pollution and 
negative external effects (organisational explanation, Andreoni/Levinson 
2001), as a consequence of the definition of property rights over common-pool 
resources and the implementation of regulations to prevent negative external-
ities (institutional explanation), and finally as the effect of technological pro-
gress improving technology to the benefit of the environment (technological 
explanation). Unfortunately, the concepts of I-PAT and EKC cannot be used for 
empirical studies here, because the amount of pollution or the degree of risk in 
medieval towns can hardly be quantified. If the EKC-paradigm is generalised to 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and communal risks, the 
different explanations are a useful pattern for a more general interpretation of 
factors determining both emergence and treatment of such risks in medieval 
towns. 
4.2 Population growth and economic development as driving 
forces of environmental degradation and communal risks 
Tracing back environmental degradation to population growth and increasing 
wealth, as suggested in the I-PAT-identity, gives some hints whether there was 
a kind of general pattern in the emergence of environmental hazards in medie-
val towns over time. Population growth certainly was a key element, because in 
the high Middle Ages population grew rapidly, but in the newly founded towns 
and cities population pressure still was relatively low, and therefore degrada-
tion of the physical environment seems to have happened at a quite moderate 
level only (Guillerme 1988: 116). Milling statistics for northern France confirm 
the rapid population growth, showing that the number of mills in towns rose 
significantly during this period (Guillerme 1988: 82-93). Numerous regulations 
by feudal lords or municipal councils then started to appear in the 13th century 
when population growth peaked. The deep concern about environmental haz-
ards that shines through these initiatives indicates that population pressure in 
towns had increased to a level at which the environmental component of the 
quality of life was seriously threatened (Magnusson/Squatriti 2000: 256).21 
Population density in cities usually was in the order of 100 inhabitants per 
                                                             
21 If an individual produced about 150 grammes excrements and 1-1,5 litres urine per day, a 
town of 5,000 inhabitants would have had to dispose ca. 275 metric tons excrements and 
3,000 metric tons urine per year (Leguay 2002: 123). 
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hectare at least, but in many places exceeded this value.22 It was at this point in 
urban history, that towns not even expanded their settled area significantly, but 
seemed to have also used expansion for a fundamental topographical reorgani-
sation, moving the polluting and hazardous crafts and other sources of hygienic 
risk like hospitals to the towns’ outskirts in the newly settled suburbs (Leguay 
2002: 138).23 In the late Middle Ages, population pressure in many towns re-
mained high. At first glance, this may seem kind of paradoxical, but in fact it 
was not, because although with Black Death population losses of towns had 
been higher than in rural areas (Rahe 1984: 128 f.), the urban-rural differential 
in terms of income increased even more in the aftermath of this crisis, making 
towns still the favoured destination for migrants. Being confined to the already 
settled area, the majority of inhabitants concentrated in the older core areas of 
towns, keeping population density still quite high.24 As a matter of fact, envi-
ronmental degradation and the difficulties for civic life related to it conse-
quently were not really decreasing. 
Assuming that wealth in towns had increased throughout the 12th and 13th 
centuries, at the same time when urban population was growing rapidly, seems 
quite reasonable. With the rise of long-distance trade in the so-called commer-
cial revolution (Lopez 1998), all across Europe towns developed into mercan-
tile centres, the Italian port cities, the Flemish urban network and the Hanseatic 
cities being the most prominent examples (Ennen 1987: 155-206). Was it in-
come rather than population growth that had stimulated the increase in envi-
ronmental degradation and the depletion of common-pool resources? As popu-
lation growth and the increase in wealth are highly correlated, this hypothesis 
cannot be tested empirically. There is a good reason at least why income could 
not have exerted the main impact on the sheer amount of pollution. Environ-
mental degradation in medieval towns resulted from polluting production 
methods and a hazardous behaviour regarding matters of daily life. None of 
these sources significantly changed over time. In contrast to modern western 
economies where for instance the rising level of affluence after World War II 
stimulated people to rely on ever more fuel-consuming and air polluting modes 
of traffic, the amount of swill and organic materials as the primary sources of 
pollution in medieval towns certainly was not increasing only because people 
                                                             
22 Population density of several cities in 13th and early 14th centuries is reported in Ennen 
1987, 228 (Ghent 100 inhabitants per hectare; Toulouse 100; Nuremberg 142; Wismar 150; 
Rostock 158; Paris 180; Lübeck 210; Béziers 322; Genoa 545). 
23 For Northern French towns it can nevertheless be shown, that in the time before artisans’ 
activities were topographically arranged such that pollutants from different crafts were neu-
tralised and helped to refresh and to purify the water again. By destroying this arrangement, 
for instance by moving abatoirs downstream the town, the problem of pollution and hygi-
enic risk was not solved, it even got worse (Guillerme 1988: 99 f.) 
24 In 14th-15th centuries population density of Northwestern German towns was about 100 
inhabitants per hectare (Cologne 100; Aachen 86-114; Münster 98; Dortmund 86-123; Du-
isburg 91; Essen 81; Soest 119). This value appears to have been quite typical for other 
German regions. (Jankrift 2003: 149 f.). 
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became wealthier. Is the concept of EKC therefore inappropriate for approach-
ing the occurrence of negative externalities in medieval towns? That environ-
mental hazards were significantly reduced in the later Middle Ages can be 
doubted, at least. The recurrent appeals, regulations and orders of authorities do 
point to the fact, that the environmental problems caused by certain daily life 
practices obviously had not been satisfyingly solved.25 Correlating emergence 
and degree of risks with income would thus not prove a decreasing upper tail of 
the functional sketch. Although municipal authorities had started to tackle the 
problem, the intensity of environmental degradation remained constant, at best, 
but probably even increased furthermore (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Potential sketches of the Environmental Kuznets Curve for medieval 
towns 
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The late Middle Ages marked a change in peoples’ attitudes towards pollu-
tion insofar as the hygienic problem was recognised and also confronted. Al-
though urban health conditions did not improve significantly until the 19th 
century, a turn regarding the awareness of communal risks can be observed. 
Being more regulated with regard to hygienic matters life in the economically 
and politically more developed late medieval urban communities was different 
from the life before, this having been subject to only a few of such rules. Once 
this turning point was passed, not the risk itself ceased, but hygienic hazards 
were seriously perceived as such and no longer neglected. The concept of EKC 
thus can be used to illustrate the issue of pollution, hygienic risks and preserv-
ing strategies in medieval urban communities, if these aspects are correlated 
with economic and political development instead of income only. In many 
towns during the late Middle Ages economic development promoted a rising 
                                                             
25 This pattern then continued well into early modern times. See on the situation in North-
western German towns Jankrift 2003: 154-167, and on that in Saxon and Silesian towns 
Schlenkrich 2005: 58-60. 
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disparity of income (Ennen 1987: 241-246).26 Speaking in economic terms, 
they were on the increasing lower tail of the original Kuznets Curve that relates 
income with income inequality (van Zanden 1995: 643 f.). A higher income 
differential within the town population meant that the majority of inhabitants 
simply was too poor to be aware of the hygienic hazard they caused with their 
behaviour and to reduce or avoid this risk. A minority of citizens in turn was 
already rich enough to develop aspirations for a life free from hygienic hazard 
and other communal risks. As these upper class members dominated urban 
politics due to their wealth and social prestige, they were able to develop an 
agenda concerning the issue of public hygiene. The term »pollution«, not 
known in the high Middle Ages, started to appear in sources of the 13th century 
(Leguay 2002: 117, 119). Feudal lords and municipal authorities were eager to 
keep their towns tidy and clean, for hygienic as well as for aesthetical reasons 
(Leguay 2002: 163 f.). Italian cities obviously became aware of environmental 
hazards earlier than communities elsewhere in Europe. This early appearance 
of measures taken against pollution likely was not only due to the immense 
population figures of these communities, but also to the quite advanced eco-
nomic and political standards they already had reached in 13th century. In con-
trast, for Northwestern German towns similar attempts of municipal authorities 
can be observed not before the 14th and 15th centuries (Jankrift 2003: 151-166). 
Towns like Soest or even Cologne were important trade centres, but certainly 
lacked the economic standard of Italian cities. Moreover, economic develop-
ment enabled investments in technology to improve the hygienic situation as 
can be seen with the construction of new water supply systems in the late Mid-
dle Ages. This became possible because wealth had increased, so that in princi-
ple expenses related to such endeavours could be afforded. If public budgets 
were short, there were at least enough wealthy citizens who could be enhanced 
to sponsor such devices. Besides the effect of economic development there was 
finally of course also the exogenous factor of plague. Black Death and the 
recurrent outbreaks of plague thereafter were important inasmuch as it intui-
tively became clear to contemporaries that an insufficient public hygiene very 
likely was to foster the spread of infectious diseases.27 This certainly was a 
major step towards a civic life that was regulated also with respect to public 
hygiene. 
                                                             
26 In Florence and Pistoia (1427), Freiburg (1445), Haarlem (1483), Dresden (1488) or Leiden 
(1498) for instance Gini-coefficients were in the order of 0.75, indicating a quite high de-
gree of income inequality (van Zanden 1995: 645 f.). 
27 The connection of public hygiene and infectious diseases was not completely understood in 
the 14th century indeed, and concerns were particularly focussed on air as being the poten-
tial transmitting medium of infections (Bulst 1979: 59; Rahe 1984: 130; Schlenkrich 2005: 
57 f.). 
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5. Conclusions 
Daily life in medieval towns was shaped by the inhabitants’ environmentally 
harmful way of life. To ensure minimal standards of the quality of life, the 
communal risks coming with these negative externalities – hygienic problems 
and fire hazard – had to be minimised to the highest degree possible. As a 
consequence of water, public hygiene and fire control being collective goods to 
the community, all the difficulties supposed to arise with respect to such goods 
– refraining from participation, free-riding, a need for property rights definition 
and third-party-enforcement – can be observed in medieval towns. Assuming 
rational behaviour of individuals, quite naturally common-pool resources like 
waters and streets were over-exploited through polluting them, and individuals 
faced no incentive to deliberately contribute to a reduction or avoidance of the 
resulting communal risks. Urban history shows that medieval communities 
nevertheless tried to overcome this collective goods problem. By municipalisa-
tion, assignment of property rights, enhancement of voluntary cooperations and 
regulations it was possible to provide citizens with common-pool resources, but 
environmental quality could only be slightly improved. 
Three points in particular are to be highlighted here. Firstly, negative envi-
ronmental externalities and, more generally, communal risks appear to have 
emerged indeed more often with wealth of medieval towns increasing over 
time. So did the awareness of these hazards as well as a fundamental under-
standing to handle the difficulties related to them. This notwithstanding, the 
driving force behind this was population growth and the resulting sharp in-
crease in population density. In the crowded late medieval towns an environ-
mentally harmful way of life caused many more problems than it has been the 
case in the less densely populated towns of the high Middle Ages. Moreover, 
although municipal administrations increasingly attempted to regulate envi-
ronmental behaviour, a clear tendency towards a significant reduction of nega-
tive externalities as suggested by the EKC-paradigm cannot be detected. Risk-
wise, medieval urban communities in a sense became victims of the economic 
power they had gained, making them an attractive destination for migrants. 
Secondly, common-pool resources became a subject of regulation by a central 
authority whenever this promised to be a profitable endeavour. Water milling 
and grain grinding are good examples for this rule. Running such enterprises or 
capitalising their property rights over these resources also shows that feudal 
lords and municipalities orientated themselves to economic gains and therefore 
took economically rational decisions. In contrast, waste disposal and cleanness 
of streets were tried to regulate only at a point in time when taking care for it 
no longer was avoidable because of the massive risks resulting from the mis-
use. Finally, facing communal risks and managing collective goods for the 
members of municipal councils was a matter of balancing the town’s economic 
interests with the conflicting interests of certain community members and the 
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necessity to improve the quality of life for all inhabitants. If municipal councils 
reacted rather inefficiently to the omnipresent hazards, it presumably happened 
also because in this trade-off fulfilling economic interests and settling internal 
conflicts usually had a higher priority than improving the quality of life.28 
Moreover, very similar to today’s considerations, the call for a personal re-
sponsibility concerning preventive means was also guided by budget restric-
tions. 
Whenever theoretical concepts are used to analyse historical institutions, the 
question arises whether this sort of approach can help explaining historical 
phenomena. Is it useful to analyse community policies of medieval towns 
within a rational-choice setting, thereby assuming individuals having tried to 
find solutions by which they could have attained a higher personal utility level? 
Rational-choice and game theory cannot explain historical details indeed, but 
these concepts allow to put the institutional arrangements of the past within a 
systematic framework. On the one hand side, the specific way in which medie-
val communities handled communal risks and quality-of-life-securing collec-
tive goods does underline that the margin for political action in medieval soci-
ety was different compared to modern society. On the other hand, the rational 
design of means implemented to make common-pool resources available, to 
prevent over-exploitation and to reduce communal risks proves very well that 
assuming rational choices with regard to the management of these problems is 
reasonable and can be justified on empirical grounds even in medieval urban 
communities. People in the Middle Ages not only were aware of the detrimen-
tal impact their way of life had on the physical environment and on civic life, 
they also found solutions to this challenge, although some of the institutional 
arrangements may not have been completely efficient. Hence, medieval urban 
history lends itself to the illustration of problems emerging for communities 
from the use of common-pool resources and from dealing with communal 
hazards to improve the quality of life, and it can also be used as a test providing 
historical evidence of whether theoretical concepts discussed in environmental 
economics are empirically valid. 
                                                             
28 Generating price stability on the grain market for instance was usually done with a clear 
aim to prevent upheaval which in turn could have threatened the political influence of the 
members of municipal councils, not primarily to improve the inhabitants’ quality of life 
(Persson 1999: 75). Such a behaviour was rent seeking insofar as social élites used munici-
pal institutions to serve their private interests. See on the application of rent seeking to me-
dieval urban policy Lehmann 2004. 
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